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Property Law-Mims v. Mims: North Carolina Eliminates
Presumption of Purchase Money Resulting Trust for
Wives
It is a well settled rule of common law that the payment of purchase
money for property held by or jointly with another raises a presumption of a
resulting trust in favor of the payor.' An exception to that rule, equally well
settled, presumes that those who furnish payment for property held by one
who is the natural object of the donor's bounty2 intend to make a gift.3 Until
recently in North Carolina, a husband furnishing payment for property held
by his wife was, under this exception, presumed to be making a gift to her,
whereas a wife furnishing payment for property held by her husband was pre-
sumed to be setting up a resulting trust.4 In Mires v. Mis,5 a 1982 decision
intended to keep the North Carolina courts "in step" with the legislature by
helping to "place men and women generally and husbands and wives particu-
larly on an equal legal footing,' 6 the North Carolina Supreme Court on its
own initiative7 rejected this discriminatory treatment of husbands and wives.8
Expressly overruling "all cases holding to the contrary,"9 the court held that in
1. See, e.g., Tarkington v. Tarkington, 301 N.C. 502, 506, 272 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1980); Wad-
dell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 674, 97 S.E.2d 222, 226 (1957); Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester,
190 N.C. 411, 416, 130 S.E. 45, 48 (1925); Harris v. Harris, 178 N.C. 7, 11, 100 S.E. 125, 129-30
(1919); see also 5 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 440 n.7 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1982) (citing
supporting cases from 28 states); id. at § 440.3 (discussing statutes in California, Georgia, Mon-
tana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota that expressly permit purchase-money result-
ing trusts). But cf. id at § 440.2 (discussing states that have statutorily abolished (Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin) or modified (Indiana and Kansas) purchase-
money resulting trusts).
2. See 5 A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 442, at 3340.
3. See, e.g., Tarkington, 301 N.C. at 506, 272 S.E.2d at 101; Thurber v. LaRoque, 105 N.C.
301, 306-07, 11 S.E. 460, 462 (1890).
4. See, e.g., Tarkington, 301 N.C. at 505, 272 S.E.2d at 101-02; Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C.
527, 531, 114 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1960); Kelly Springeeld Tire Co., 190 N.C. at 416, 130 S.E. at 48;
Deese v. Deese, 176 N.C. 527, 528, 97 S.E. 475, 475 (1918).
5. 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982).
6. Id at 56, 286 S.E.2d at 789. The court here alluded to the Equitable Distribution Act,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp. 1981). In discussing the Act the court noted the legislature's
mandate "that one rule, the same for husbands as for wives, would govern property division be-
tween them upon dissolution of the marriage." 305 N.C. at 51, 286 S.E.2d at 786-87. To this end
the Equitable Distribution Act distinguishes "[miarital property" from "[sleparate property" and
orders an equal property division between husband and wife based upon the net value of marltal
property. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (b)(1)-(2), (c) (Cum. Supp. 1981). If the court finds an equal
division of property to be inequitable, the marital property is divided equitably. Id. § 50-20(c).
See generally Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: 4 Preliminary Analysis,
61 N.C.L. REv. 247 (1983) (discussing Equitable Distribution Act).
7. The court was asked only to rule whether "the evidentiary showing... entitleld] defend-
ant to summary judgment." 305 N.C. at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 781-82. The court, however, used Mims
as a vehicle to effect a sweeping change in the law of resulting trusts.
8. See id at 56, 286 S.E.2d at 789 (noting the "unmistakable legislative policy that there be
no difference in treatment of husbands and wives in our courts based solely on gender"). See infra
notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
9. Id at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787. Mirs expressly overruled Tarkington v. Tarkington, 301
N.C. 502, 272 S.E.2d 99 (1980). Mins, 305 N.C. at 53 n.9, 286 S.E.2d at 787 n.9. In Tarkington
the court had concluded that "[t]he facts of the case before us offer no compelling reason to
all cases to which the Equitable Distribution Act' 0 does not apply the rule will
be "where a spouse furnishing the consideration causes property to be con-
veyed to the other spouse, a presumption of gift arises, which is rebuttable by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence.""1I
Nineteen months after being married Allen Mims (plaintiff) bought a
house in which he and his wife (defendant) took up residence.' 2 He paid the
entire purchase price with funds he had received from his father and grandfa-
ther.13 At the signing of the contract of sale Mims' realtor told him that in
North Carolina homes had to be titled in the names of both husband and
wife.' 4 Believing he had no alternative, 15 Mims had the home titled to both
himself and his wife. 16 Shortly after the parties separated, plaintiff filed an
action seeking reformation of the deed to his house on the ground of mutual
mistake and a declaratory judgment that he was sole owner of the property.17
change this long-standing presumptive rule" that a woman who furnishes consideration for prop-
erty taken in her husband's name intends that he hold it in trust for her. 301 N.C. at 506, 272
S.E.2d at 102. At the time of the Tarkington decision, however, the legislature had not passed the
Equitable Distribution Act and the court, therefore, may not have felt pressure to change the law,
as it did in Mim. See 305 N.C. at 51, 56, 286 S.E.2d at 786, 789 (expressing the court's desire to
follow the legislature's lead). See supra note 6 for an explanation of the Equitable Distribution
Act.
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp. 1981). See supra note 6 for a brief explanation of
the Equitable Distribution Act.
11. 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 787.
12. Id at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 782. Because plaintiff bought the house after he and defendant
married, in the absence of plaintiffs clear expression of intention not to make a gift of one-half the
house, defendant would have become owner of one-half. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying
text. But see infra notes 13, 16-18.
13. Id at 44, 286 S.E.2d at 782. Because the money was given to plaintiff alone, it was his
separate property. The property in question, therefore, was purchased with plaintiffs separate
property and put in the name of another (by the entirety). Under the common law this is a
purchase-money trust, a type of resulting trust (unless excepted due to husband-wife relationship).
0. BOGERT, THE LAW OF"TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 454, at 624-27 (rev. 2d ed. 1977).
14. 305 N.C. at 44, 286 S.E.2d at 782. In most residential purchases the husband and wife
need to borrow money. Most lending institutions require both spouses to sign the note and deed
of trust, hence both names usually appear on the title. Due to the prevalence of this situation,
many North Carolina realtors may believe the names of both husband and wife must appear on
the title. Legally, this is a false assumption.
15. Mims claimed in his affidavit that "[pirior to [the] closing, at the closing, and at all times
since the closing, [he had] told the defendant. . . [and she had agreed] that since [he] was paying
for [the] real estate. . . it was [his] and [his] alone." Id. at 44, 286 S.E.2d at 783. As a resulting
trust arises "by implication ... of law to carry out the presumed intention of the parties," Wad-
dell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 674, 97 S.E.2d 222, 226 (1957), in the absence of an exception for
husbands, plaintiff appears to have set up a resulting trust. But see infra notes 16-17.
16. 305 N.C. at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 782. In putting his wife's name on the deed plaintiff was,
under North Carolina common law, presumed to be making a gift to her of an entirety interest in
the property. To rebut this presumption and to establish a resulting trust he must have "clear,
strong, and convincing" evidence that his intentions were otherwise. 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA
FAMILY LAW § 113, at 44 (4th ed. 1980). Plaintiffs claim that he told defendant the property was
to be his alone is a clear statement of his intent that must be considered because it was made both
before and at the time of the passing of the title. 305 N.C. at 45, 286 S.E.2d at 783. See G.
BOGERT, supra note 13, § 459, at 718.
17. 305 N.C. at 43, 286 S.E 2d 779, 782. Reformation of a deed may be obtained if the deed
fails to conform to the parties' intentions, if the party praying for reformation was mistaken as to
the deed's factual contents and the other party knew of the mistake and kept silent, or if the party
praying for reformation was mistaken as to the deed's factual contents because of "fraudulent
affirmative behavior" by the other party. 6A R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROP-
ERTY § 894 (1949 & Supp. 1982).
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The superior court held that plaintiff would not be able to make out a claim
for mutual mistake' 8 at trial and granted defendant summary judgment.
Plaintiff appealed and the court of appeals affirmed.' 9
In reversing the court of appeals the supreme court agreed that Mims
would not be able to succeed at trial in his claim for mutual mistake.20 The
court held, however, that Mims' failure to seek recovery on the alternative
theory of resulting trust should not have prevented the appeals court from
considering that theory.21 The court then held "[bloth the pleadings and the
evidentiary showing on the motion for summary judgment indicate plaintiff
may be able to obtain the relief he seeks at trial by proving the facts necessary
to give rise to a resulting trust in his favor." 22 In so holding the court seized
the opportunity to reconsider and modernize North Carolina's resulting trust
law.
In its reformulation of the law the court considered four "compelling"
reasons that it felt made modification necessary. The court first pointed out
18. See 305 N.C. at 45, 286 S.E.2d at 783. The supreme court pointed out that there could be
no recovery on this theory because both parties understood that the deed would be made out in
both names, and the misunderstanding of North Carolina law did not constitute mistake. See id
at 61, 286 S.E.2d at 792; Wright v. McMullan, 249 N.C. 591, 107 S.E.2d 98 (1959).
19. Mims v. Mines, 48 N.C. App. 216, 268 S.E.2d 544 (1980).
20. 305 N.C. at 45, 286 S.E.2d at 783. Mims also argued that the differing common-law rules
"unconstitionally discriminate on the basis of sex," but the court refused to consider whether a
constitutional analysis of the unequal treatment of husbands and wives under North Carolina
resulting trust law would offer Mims relief. Id. at 47-48, 286 S.E.2d at 784. The court explained
that "neither the United States Constitution nor the North Carolina Constitution require [sic]
courts to employ presumptions of gift or trust in settling property disputes"; the court further
noted that "[t]hese presumptions are not constitutional concepts, rather they are equitable tools
. Id. at 48, 286 S.E.2d at 784.
In so explaining its refusal to consider the constitutional implications of these presumptions
the court avoided the real issue. While it is true that neither constitution requires the use of a
presumptive trust or presumptive gift rule, the fourteenth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution does require that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall. . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
The United States Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren emphasized that "[t]o withstand [an equal
protection clause]. . . challenge,. . . classifications by gender must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976). In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), the Supreme Court upheld a Craig v.
Boren analysis of a Louisiana law, holding once again that "gender-based discrimination [is]...
unconstitutional absent a showing that the classification is tailored to further an important govern-
mental interest.' 450 U.S. at 460.
Had the North Carolina Supreme Court so analyzed Mfrns the outcome would likely have
been the same as that in Craig v. Boren and Kirchberg v. Feenstra. The presumption of gift for a
husband and of trust for a wife in a resulting trust situation is just the sort of gender-based dis-
crimination condemned by the fourteenth amendment. At one time there was an important gov-
ernmental interest protected by this discrimination--the protection of wives from their husbands
in a world dominated by men. But as the Minms court points out, such protection is no longer
needed. See 305 N.C. at 48-51, 286 S.E.2d at 785-86.
21. See 305 N.C. at 61, 286 S.E.2d at 792. The court noted that the nature of an action is not
determined solely by what a party calls it, id. (citing Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 454, 276
S.E. 2d 325, 336 (1981)), and that a defendant is entitled to summary judgment only if "the fore-
cast of evidence available for trial (when viewed most favorably to plaintiff). . . demonstrates
that plaintiff will not at trial be able to make out at least aprimafacie case. . . ." Id. at 56, 286
S.E.2d at 789. The court concluded that plaintiff "presented a sufficient evidentiary showing to
allow him at trial to prove that defendant holds on resulting trust for him." Id. at 61, 286 S.E.2d
at 792.
22. Id. at 46, 286 S.E.2d at 783; see also supra note 21.
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that the old, discriminatory presumption 23 was originally developed "'out of a
desire to protect [wives] in [their] subordinate and inferior position against the
importunities and influence of [their] husband[s].' "24 Noting that our laws no
longer reflect these notions of marital relations,25 the court dismissed such
conceptions as antiquated.26 Next the court considered the opinions of other
courts and noted that many have abandoned such discriminatory treatment of
married couples in favor of a presumptive gift rule for both husbands and
wives.27 The court then considered the writings of commentators who support
the presumptive gift rule.28 Finally, observing that the North Carolina Legis-
lature had recently "indicated its view that the same rules should apply to both
spouses" 29 by enacting the Equitable Distribution Act, the court expressed its
belief that its modification of resulting trust law was in keeping with legislative
23. The presumption in question is that a husband intends to make a gift whereas a wife
intends to set up a trust.
24. 305 N.C. at 49, 286 S.E.2d at 785 (quoting G. BOGERT, supra note 13, § 460, at 728). See
infra note 25 for examples of how this "subordinate and inferior" position was manifested in
North Carolina and how North Carolina has updated its laws.
25. 305 N.C. at 49, 286 S.E.2d at 785. The North Carolina Legislature and Supreme Court
recently have done much to alleviate the discriminatory treatment of wives. Probably the most
visible of these corrective measures is the Equitable Distribution Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §50-20
(Cum. Supp. 1981). See supra note 6 for a brief explanation of the Act. Other equally important
measures have been taken. In 1980 the supreme court recognized for the first time a wife's right to
a cause of action for loss of consortium, a right husbands enjoy at common law. See Nicholson v.
Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980). In 1977 the legislature repealed
N.C. GEN STAT. § 52-6 (1976), which required a wife who wished to contract with her husband for
the disposition of her own real estate to submit- to an examination before a certifying officer to
ensure that the contract was reasonable and not injurious to the wife. Husbands, of course, were
under no such requirement. Act of May 13, 1977, ch. 375, § 1, 1977 Sess. Laws 375. N.C. GEN
STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981), enacted in 1977, provides that mothers and fathers of equal
means are equally responsible for the support of their minor children. See also infra note 80
(discussing the impact of An Act to Equalize Between Married Persons the Right to Income,
Possession, and Control in Property Owned Concurrently in Tenancy by the Entirety, ch. 1245,
1981 N.C. Sess. Laws (Regular Sess., 1982) (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §39-13.6 (1982
Interim Supp.).
26. See 305 N.C. at 49, 286 S.E.2d at 785.
27. See id. at 49-50, 286 S.E.2d at 785-86. See, e.g., Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 528, 347
A.2d. 477, 480 (1975) (favoring the presumptive gift rule as consistent with a marriage in which
the husband is no longer the "sole provider" and in which "both parties ... provide for each
other"). The Butler court was influenced by the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment which
"keeps the law from imposing 'different benefits or different burdens upon members of a society
based on the fact that they may be man or woman."' 305 N.C. 41, 50 n.8, 286 S.E.2d at 786 n.8
(quoting Butler, 464 Pa. at 527, 347 A.2d. at 480). See also White v. Amenta, 110 Conn. 314, 317,
148 A. 345, 346 (1930); Printup v. Patton, 91 Ga. 422, 434, 18 S.E. 311, 312 (1893); Hogan v.
Hogan, 286 Mass. 524, 526, 190 N.E. 715, 716 (1934); Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 222-23, 200
P.2d 251, 264 (1948); Peterson v. Massey, 155 Neb. 829, 835, 53 N.W.2d 912, 916 (1952); Denny v.
Schwabacher, 54 Wash. 689, 692, 104 P. 137, 138 (1909).
28. 305 N.C. at 50-51, 286 S.E.2d at 786 (quoting 2 R. LEE, supra note 16, § 113 at 45 ("since
a husband is no longer necessarily the 'sole provider,' there should be a presumption that either
spouse has made a gift to the other") (emphasis added); I H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY § 272, at 461 (B. Jones 3d ed. 1939) ("reason would seem to support the view in favor of the
presumption that a gift was intended"); G. BOGERT, supra note 13, § 460, at 727 ("it may with
some reason be urged that a wife is under a moral duty to aid her husband financially ....
Furthermore.. .affection running from hife to husband is.. .as strong as... from husband to
wife .... In addition... wives very generally make gifts [in anticipation of death] to their
husbands").




To understand the import of the court's holding one must appreciate the
longevity and constancy of the law that the Mims decision alters. The concept
of the resulting trust has its roots in fifteenth century English law.3 1 From
these roots the resulting trust has emerged in twentieth-century North Caro-
lina law virtually unchanged. The "classic example of a resulting trust"32 is
the purchase-money resulting trust, in which one party pays the purchase
money but another party takes the title.33 Such a trust is "a creature of equity
and arises by. . .operation of law to carry out the presumed intention of the
part[ies]."'34 In such a transaction, the payor is presumed to have purchased
30. Id. at 56, 286 S.E.2d at 789.
31. G. BOGERT, supra note 13, § 453; P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 143
(1975); 5 A. ScoTTsupra note 1, § 405, at 3216. See generally W. HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAW 140-75 (1927) (discussing the rise of the use, the Statute of
Uses, and the effects of the Statute of Uses).
Because medieval land law was a "rigid and narrow... system of law ... [and therefore]
did not meet the needs of landowners," the feoffment to use was developed to circumvent the law.
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 137-38. In a feoffment to use the cestui-que use (equitable owner or
trust beneficiary) transferred legal ownership of his property to a feoffee to uses (legal owner or
trustee) who was then compelled in equity by the King's Chancellor to use his powers as legal
owner for the benefit of the beneficial owner. Id. at 147-49. In so doing the beneficial owner
acquired a great deal of control over the property that, as legal owner, the common law denied
him. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 105 (1966) (enumerating those powers over property a cestui-que use gained by transferring legal
ownership and retaining equitable ownership). Because not all such feoffments to uses were de-
clared clearly, the Chancellor often had to decide what relief to give in a transfer in which no use
was declared or in which the transferor did not retain the entire equitable interest. 5 A. ScoTT,
supra note 1, § 404, at 3211. Because the practice of splitting equitable and legal interests was so
common, the transferor was presumed to have retained the equitable interest in both situations.
Id. at 3212. Accordingly, the courts presumed that a transferee who gave no consideration "held
upon a resulting use for the transferor." Id. § 405, at 3216. Although the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen.
8, ch. 10 (1535), enacted in 1535 and effective in 1536, converted the transferor's interest to a legal
interest, effectively nullifying the transfer, the courts continued to presume that the transferor's
intention in such a trust was to preserve a use for himself. 5 A. ScoTT, supra note 1, § 405, at
3217. (Professor Scott suggests that the reason for the court's continued presumption that the
transferor intended to retain a use might be that "although these presumptions were originally
founded upon a desire to carry out the real intention of the parties, they had become crystallized
in definite rules of law before the Statute of Uses was passed ...." Id.) The enactment of the
Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (1676), which provided that "declarations or creations of uses or
trusts in land must be manifested and proved by a signed memorandum... " 5 A. SCOTT, supra
note 1, §405, at 3217, eventually resulted in the courts' refusal to find a resulting trust where a
gratuitous transfer was in evidence. Id. at 3218. In fact, "[tlhere are no modem cases in which it
has been held that where a gratuitous conveyance is made without a declaration of trust a result-
ing trust arises in favor of the transferor." Id. Resulting trusts, however, were well settled, "law-
inferred" trusts that were excepted expressly from the Statute of Frauds, G. BOGERT, supra note
13, §452, at 615, and, as evidenced by a plethora of twentieth-century cases, are still very much in
evidence in North Carolina today. See, e.g., Cline v. Cline, 297 N.C. 336, 344, 255 S.E.2d 399,
404-05 (1979); Vinson v. Smith, 259 N.C. 95, 98, 130 S.E.2d 45, 47-48 (1963); Carlisle v. Carlisle,
225 N.C. 462, 465, 35 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1945); Wilson v. Williams, 215 N.C. 407, 411, 2 S.E.2d 19,
21-22 (1939); Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288, 292, 199 S.E. 83, 86-87 (1938); Miller v. Miller, 200
N.C. 458, 461, 157 S.E. 604, 605 (1931); McWhirter v. McWhirter, 155 N.C. 145, 147, 71 S.E. 59,
60 (1911); Hendren v. Hendren, 153 N.C. 505, 506, 69 S.E. 506, 506 (1910).
32. J. WEBSTER, WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 507 at 630-31 (P.
Hedrick ed. 1981).
33. See, e.g., Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 416, 130 S.E. 45, 48 (1925);
Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426, 435-36, 48 S.E. 775, 778 (1904).
34. Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 674, 97 S.E.2d 222, 226 (1957).
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the property to be held by another for his benefit.35
The presumption of gift when a husband purchases property that is titled
in the name of his wife is a long standing exception to the common law result-
ing trust rule. Under a "legal, or. . . [perhaps even] a moral obligation to
maintain [his wife]," the husband was thus presumed to be making a quite
natural gift to his wife when he titled property in her name.36 There was, prior
to Mims, no such presumption running from wife to husband.37 This apparent
inequality was well founded in North Carolina's common law: "In no court in
this country was the common law conception of the marital relation, with all
of its incidents, more clearly and tenaciously retained than in [North Caro-
lina]."38 Upon marriage, the personal property of a woman vested absolutely
in her husband.39 Real property also came under the husband's possession
and control,4° and was considered his to convey, at least in a limited sense.4 1
It was thus entirely natural in this male-dominated scheme that the wife would
be unable to convey property without the consent of her husband.42 The wife
was presumed to be so deeply under the husband's dominance and control
that the legislature required that a probate officer examine her, in private,
before any conveyance in which she joined with her husband was deemed to
be voluntary.4 3
Reform did not come until the late nineteenth century, with the North
Carolina Constitution of 1868. Article X, section 6 provided that all property
acquired by the wife, either before or after marriage, "shall be and remain the
sole and separate estate and property of such female." 44 The provision was of
limited effect, however, since
the concept that a married woman was incapable of engaging in busi-
ness transactions with her husband by reason of his dominant influ-
35. Id.
36. Thurber v. LaRoque, 105 N.C. 301, 306-07, 11 S.E. 460, 462 (1890).
37. Tarkington v. Tarkington, 301 N.C. 502, 506, 272 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1980); Deese v. Deese,
176 N.C. 527, 528, 97 S.E. 475, 475 (1918).
38. Ball & Sheppard v. Paquin, 140 N.C. 83, 87, 52 S.E. 410, 411-12 (1905).
39. See O'Connor v. Harris, 81 N.C. 279 (1879); Arrington v. Yarbrough, 54 N.C. 72 (1853).
40. See Richardson v. Richardson, 150 N.C. 549, 64 S.E. 510 (1909); Taylor v. Taylor, 112
N.C. 134, 16 S.E. 1019 (1893).
41. Upon marriage, the husband was empowered to sell and convey the land for a period not
exceeding coverture. Given the rarity of divorce at common law, this essentially meant the shorter
of his or his wife's lives. This estate became substantially enlarged, however, upon the birth of
issue to the marriage. At that point, the husband became seized of his wife's lands for the period
of his natural life. See Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 445, 75 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1953).
42. Id.
43. For a thorough discussion of the privy exam statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 52-6 (repealed
1977), see Spencer v. Spencer, 37 N.C. App. 481, 246 S.E.2d 805 (1978).
44. The heart of this provision is currently embodied in article X, § 4 of the State constitu-
tion, which states:
The real and personal property of any female in this State acquired before marriage, and
all property, real and personal, to which she may, after marriage, become in any manner
entitled, shall be and remain the sole and separate estate and property of such female,
and shall not be liable for any debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and
may be devised and bequeathed and conveyed by her, subject to such regulations and
limitations as the General Assembly may prescribe.
N.C. CONST., art. X, § 4.
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ence over her and that any deed she might execute conveying
property to him was executed under his coercion and therefore void
still prevailed and was enforced as a part of the law of the land.45
The historical justification for the exclusion of wife-to-husband gifts from
the resulting trust exception began to crumble in the 1960s. The legislature
began to recognize that the wife was not necessarily dependent on the husband
and could indeed be the gift giver of the family. In 1965, the statutory require-
ment that a husband join in his wife's conveyance was stricken by the legisla-
ture.46 Two years later, the statutory definition of a "dependent spouse" for
purpose8 of alimony was made sex neutral.47 The privy exam statute also fell,
in 1977, to the wave of legislative reform.48 Two additional developments
came in 1981-the passage of the Equitable Distribution Act,4 9 which the
Mirms court found to evidence a legislative determination that the sexes be
treated equally,50 and removal of the statutory presumption that the husband
was the supporting spouse.51
The court's decision to apply the presumptive gift rule in all cases not
governed by the Equitable Distribution Act modernizes the law52 but strays
from the apparent intention of the North Caroina Legislature. In the Equita-
ble Distribution Act the legislature specifies for the courts what property is
"'marital" and what remains "separate" in a property division at divorce.53
45. Perry v. Stanil, 237 N.C. at 446-47, 75 S.E.2d at 516.
46. Act of June 9, 1965, ch. 878, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 1175.
47. Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1152, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1766. "Dependent spouse" is now
defined as "a spouse, whether husband or wife, who is actually substantially dependent upon the
other spouse for his or her maintenance and support or is substantially in need of maintenance
and support from the other spouse." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1976).
48. Act of May 13, 1977, ch. 375, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 375 (effective Jan. 1, 1978). The
statute had occasionally been advanced as support for the wife's exception from the resulting trust
presumption, since it was based upon the presumed dominant position of the husband vis-A-vis his
wife. See, e.g., Sims v. Ray, 96 N.C. 87, 2 S.E. 443 (1887).
49. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 1184 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). See supra note 6.
50. 305 N.C. at 51, 286 S.E.2d at 786.
51. Act of April 27, 1981, ch. 274, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 239 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
52. Unwarranted protection of wives still lingers in many jurisdictions. See generally 5 A.
ScoTT, supra note 1, § 442, at 3337 n.9 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1982) (citing cases from sixteen states
that presume a resulting trust rather than a gift when a wife purchased property in the name of her
husband).
53. The Act provides in part:
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "Marital property" means all real and personal property acquired by either
spouse during the course of the marriage and presently owned, except property
determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (2) of this
section.
(2) "Separate property" means all real and personal property acquired by a spouse
before marriage or acquired by a spouse by bequest, devise, descent, or gift dur-
ing the course of the marriage. However, property acquired by gift from the
other spouse during the course of the marriage shall be considered separate
property only if such an intention is stated in the conveyance. Property acquired
in exchange for separate property shall be considered separate property regard-
less of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both. The
increase in value of separate property and the income derived from separate
[Vol. 61
MIMS v. MIMS
The Act addresses the resulting trust situation, providing that "[p]roperty ac-
quired in exchange for separate property shall be considered separate property
regardless of whether the title is in the name of the husband or wife or both."'54
The presumptive gift rule clearly is abolished in favor of the presumptive trust
rule in the divorce context. The Mims court explained its divergence from the
legislative intent, stating that it did not feel "compelled to apply the presump-
tive trust. . . simply because the legislature seems to have shown a preference
for a variant of the trust rule"' 55 and that applying the presumptive gift rule to
both husband and wife is "the better rule because it recognizes that such trans-
fers are normally motivated by love and affection and the desire to make a
gift."'56 The court further explained that while the primary focus of the Act is
on "equitably distributing 'marital' as opposed to 'separate' property upon disso-
lution of [a] marriage," the rule announced in Mires is intended to apply in all
pertinent disputes of husband-wife property ownership.5 7 In addition to this
difference of purpose, the court pointed out that the Equitable Distribution
Act is based upon the "relative positions of the parties at the time of divorce,"
while the modified common law rule operates from the basis of "what was
intended at the time the property was acquired." 58
Although the court's position in not following the legislative lead is logi-
cally and historically sound,59 the reasoning employed in justifying that de-
parture may be criticized on two counts. First, in deciding to apply the
presumptive gift rule to transfers between husbands and wives, the court re-
jected the alternative of no presumption at all.60 Although the court heeded
Professor Scott's advice that "we should not maintain a rule of law premised
on the belief 'that husbands have a greater affection for their wives than wives
have for their husbands,' ",61 it did not adopt Scott's ultimate conclusion that
the best approach is to ascertain intention "as shown by all the circumstances"
surrounding the transfer rather than to rely on any presumption. 62 Even
property shall be considered separate property. All professional licenses and
business licenses which would terminate on transfer shall be considered separate
property. Vested pension or retirement rigts and the expectation of nonvested
pension or retirement rights shall be considered separate property.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(l)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981). For an analysis of the distinction between
separate and marital property, see Sharp, supra note 6.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
55. 305 N.C. at 53-4, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
56. Id. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
57. Id. at 54, 286 S.E.2d at 788 (emphasis in original).
58. Id
59. See 5 A. ScoTr, supra note 1, § 442, at 3339-43 for a discussion of the principle to be
applied by courts in presuming trust or gift. The fact that wives today often fulfill the same
functions as husbands suggests that they should be treated the same under the law.
60. 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
61. Id. (quoting 5 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 442, at 3339). Professor Scott explains that
neither closeness of relationship nor extent of natural affection necessarily indicates a relationship
in which one party can be presumed to be making a gift to another party. As an example, he
notes, "Some... would contend that it is more likely gat a man should intend to make a gift to
his mistress than to his wife." A mistress, of course, would not be presumed to have received a
gift. 5 A. ScoTr, supra note 1, § 442, at 3341. See also infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
62. 5 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 442, at 3340.
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though presumptions may be rebutted by further evidence, Scott correctly
points out that in many cases the presumption is given conclusive weight:63
"Such a rule clearly gives too great a weight to the relationship between the
parties. The question is really one of intention.. . . The notion that inten-
tion can be determined by the application of hard and fast rules of law is
common in primitive systems of law. . . -64 The court's retention of a rule
of presumptive intent in transfers between spouses, while commendable for its
even-handed approach, was not as progressive.a modification of the law as it
might have been.
As an alternative to rejecting presumptions entirely, the court might have
lowered the threshhold of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption. The
presumption of gift arising when one spouse furnishes the consideration for
property received by the other is "rebuttable by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence." 65 This moderately heavy burden of proof, always on the party con-
tending there was no gift, is part of the "undue weight" accorded presump-
tions that Professor Scott criticizes.66 Since the critical inquiry is the intention
of the parties, a presumption of gift should be rebuttable by the preponderance
of the evidence: "The better view is that it is necessary to produce such evi-
dence as is required to establish any other fact."'67 Even if the court were
unwilling to forgo entirely the convenience of a presumption, it might have
more closely approached the central issue of determining intent from all the
circumstances by easing the burden on the party seeking to rebut the
presumption.
The second problem with the court's reasoning is its insistence that there
is a difference in the principles underlying the Equitable Distribution Act and
the common law resulting trust.68 The court held that the provisions of the
Act should not be applied by analogy because the Act "is designed . . . to
divide property equitably, based upon the relative positions of the parties at
the time of the divorce," whereas the case at issue required the court to devise
a rule to ascertain what the parties intended "when the property was ac-
quired."69 The distinction, however, may have been too hastily drawn. Al-
though the primary purpose of the Act is to provide rules for a fair distribution
of marital assets at the time of divorce, the court erred in declaring that the
intention of the donor is irrelevant in the determination of what property
should be distributed to each spouse under the Act. When property is ac-
quired by gift from the other spouse during the course of the marriage, a pre-
sumption arises that the property is "marital" property of the donee unless a
contrary intention is stated in the conveyance. 70 Thus, at least in the context
63. Id. See also Shue v. Shue, 241 N.C. 65, 84 S.E.2d 302 (1954).
64. 5 A. Sco'rr, supra note 1, § 442, at 3340.
65. 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
66. 5 A. ScoTr, supra note 1, § 442 at 3340.
67. Id. § 443, at 3347.
68. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
69. 305 N.C. at 54, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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of direct interspousal gifts, the Act does not preclude an inquiry into the intent
of the donor at the time of the transfer.
Furthermore, the court's failure to follow the approach taken in the Equi-
table Distribution Act may lead to inconsistent results that depend entirely
upon whether or not the issue is raised in a divorce proceeding. Wight v.
Wright,7' a post-Mins case, illustrates the divergence between the Mins rule
and the Equitable Distribution Act. Plaintiff, a carpenter, spent $17,270 of his
separate money making improvements on his wife's house, which was her sep-
arate property. In return for these improvements, plaintiff claimed that de-
fendant had promised to "convey the property to the parties [plaintiff and
defendant] as tenants by the entirety." When defendant refused to so convey
the property plaintiff brought an action, in the unusual posture of a husband
suing his wife as creditor, for a money judgment and an equitable lien in the
amount of his expenditures on defendant's property.72 In holding that plain-
tiff was not entitled to relief, the court, noting Mins, stated that "the same
presumption of gift should apply whichever spouse furnishes improvements
on the other spouse's land '73 and charged plaintiff with the responsibility of
rebutting that presumption with "clear, cogent and convincing evidence."
74
Had this been a divorce action the Equitable Distribution Act could well have
dictated a different result. Because plaintiff improved defendant's property
with his "separate property," under section (b)(2) of the Equitable Distribu-
tion Act there would be no presumption of a gift to defendant75 and the court
might well have found defendant to be unjustly enriched and plaintiff deserv-
ing of relief. It seems inconsistent that the outcome of plaintiffs action should
hinge on the timing of his suit before a divorce action.
Whatever the reasons for not following the legislative lead, the court's
decision is well founded in the law of the resulting trust, which posits that the
presumption of an intention to make a gift depends on whether the transferee
is the "natural object of the bounty of the payor."76 This elusive phrase gener-
ally means that the transferee shares the kind of relationship with the, payor
that would make it natural for the payor to be interested in him and "make
provision for his advancement." 77 The past exclusion of the husband as a
natural object of the wife's bounty was an aberration from the law born out of
the wife's presumed inferior position to her husband, a position that generally
viewed the wife as unlikely if not unable to make a gift at all.78 In changing
this anachronistic presumption the court recognized the wife's right to own
property and the likelihood that she might give property to her husband.
79
71. 305 N.C. 345, 289 S.E.2d 347 (1982).
72. Id. at 346, 289 S.E.2d at 348.
73. Id. at 355, 289 S.E.2d at 354.
74. Id. at 354-55, 289 S.E.2d at 353.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
76. 5 A. Scorr, supra note 1, § 442, at 3340.
77. Id
78. Id.
79. It should be pointed out, however, that until An Act to Equalize Between Married Per-
sons the Right to Income, Possession and Control in Property Owned Concurrently in Tenancy by
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Although the Mims decision changes longstanding North Carolina com-
mon law and therefore was given careful consideration by the court,80 its re-
sult has been long overdue. Lawmakers have become increasingly aware of
the need to treat men and women equally under the law.81 The court's deci-
sion to employ the presumptive gift rule rather than the presumptive trust rule
does not lessen the decision's impact in that context, because both spouses are
treated equally. Nevertheless, in choosing to employ the presumptive gift rule
the court has created an inconsistency between legislated law and court-made
law that renders the basis of the common-law resulting trust uncertain.82 A
body of law that dictates one result in a divorce action and another in, for
example, an action by a deceased's children to gain ownership of property
willed to them by the deceased, appears arbitrary. Moreover, if the purpose of
the resulting trust is to accomplish the presumed intentions of the parties, the
retention of any rule of presumption is likely to lead to inaccurate conclusions
in many cases. In the wake of Mimes v. Mims, husbands and wives now enjoy
equal treatment, but in granting that equality the supreme court has altered
the foundation on which the common-law trust was built.
R. BENJAMIN WRIGHT
the Entirety, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6 (1982 Interim Supp.), which became effective 11 months
after the Mins decision, a wife's position was not equal to her husband's with respect to property
owned as tenants by the entirety. Under the old law a husband bad exclusive rights to use and
control entirety property. In addition, a husband did not have to account to his wife for rents and
profits received from the property. Also, because a husband had the exclusive right to control and
use entireties property, he could lease the property to a third party and thereby exclude his wife
from it. See e.g., Moore v. Shore, 208 N.C. 446, 181 S.E. 275 (1935); Dorsey v. Kirkland, 177 N.C.
520, 99 S.E. 407 (1919); 2 R. LEE, supra note 16, § 115, at 50; Comment, Real Property-Tenancy
by the Entirety in North Carolina: An Idea Whose Time Bas Gone?, 58 N.C.L. REV. 997, 999
(1980). The Mires decision, by requiring the gift presumption when a wife pays her own money
for property put in her and her husband's names as tenants by the entirety, ensured that a husband
would enjoy the rights he had been denied under the presumptive trust rule, which kept beneficial
ownership of the property in the wife's hands. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.6, however, equalizes
control, use, possession, rents, income, and profits of real property held as tenants by the entirety.
In short, the legislature has tidied up the job started by the Mims court.
80. See 305 N.C. at 54-6, 286 S.E.2d at 788-89. The court emphasized that, although its
normal policy "'in matters involving title to property ... [is] to leave changes in the law to the
legislature,' id at 54, 286 S.E.2d at 788 (quoting Rabon v. Rowan Memorial Hosp., 269 N.C. 1,
20, 152 S.E.2d 485, 498 (1967)), it was "convinced that changes in... society... demanded a
change in the law." Id at 55, 286 S.E.2d at 788 (citing cases illustrating the court's willingness to
adjust to changed circumstances).
81. Increased attention to equalization of divorce settlements, such as North Carolina's Equi-
table Distribution Act and the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment by 35 states, are exam-
ples of this awareness. See also supra note 25.
82. The inconsistency is a difference in the interpretation of the transferor's intention in the
resulting trust situation.
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